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Stories From The Front Lines:
How NFMA Developed and Key Players
In addition to discussing why NFMA came to be, I ’ll cite 
examples of sections being violated. Some may wonder why is this 
significant? NFMA came into existence because for over 7 long 
decades the Forest Service continuously violated two important 
restrictions in its charter 1897 Act. Those who worked to pass NFMA 
thought that the traumatic impacts of the stern upbraiding by the 
1975 4th Circuit Court of Appeals would usher in a new era. Obeying 
laws would become a Forest Service centerpiece. This, regrettably, 
hasn’t been the case. Parts of NFMA, as well as laws on endangered 
species, watersheds and fisheries have been resulted in Court 
decisions created by serious and flagrant law violations. Anyone 
who has read Judge Dwyers’ decision in the Spotted Owl cases is 
struck by the fact that this bedrock principle of administration 
has been violated too often. Laws are passed to set out courses of 
conduct, public and private. In assessing NFMA after 20 years, and 
considering whether changes are desirable, an examination of how 
faithfully it has been carried out is appropriate.
Some argue that NFMA has defects. No law is perfect. Failure 
to faithfully carry out a law because one considers it defective, 
or by overt or covert violation, undermines the foundation of a 
society. We need to consider whether the broad authority the Act 
confers has been effectively and wisely used. Matters some may cite 
can be corrected by public discussion and regulation revision.
Much of the controversy and contentions that the Forest 
Service faces today result from the view of users, commodity and 
noncommodity, that the Forest Service isn’t following a law, the 
regulations the agency wrote to implement it, or its precepts of 
sound practices.
Accidents Of Earlier Times.
The 1891 Act was an accident. It authorized Reserves, which 
need not be forested land, but made no management provisions. It 
was the equivalent of the first Wilderness Act created by an
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undebated midnight addition to a 23 section public land reform 
bill. The Senate managers denied they had added it. The House 
managers admitted it, but said it did nothing. Water for irrigation 
was a driving force. For the next 6 years Western members thwarted 
Cong. McRae’s efforts to create a management framework. Cleveland 
refused to add Reserves that couldn’t be managed.
The 1897 Act also was an accident. McKinley had just beaten 
Bryan. Cleveland, a two term President, ended this term with a 
recession, and widespread unpopularity. In a mood of defiance he 
doubled the Reserves to 40 million acres a few days before leaving 
office. This action truly "locked up" their resources on public 
domain in South Dakota and Montana where 2 major mining firms 
operated. The Senate adopted rider on an appropriation bill, using 
much of McRae’s approach as "window dressing".
The entire debate was about how Cleveland’s "lock up" would 
destroy the mining industry. The Senate made sure that the mining 
industry got an unregulated right to cut, free of charge, all the 
timber needed for mining, and get free minerals. The House added 
the infamous "in-lieu" selection section. There was no discussion 
of the wisdom of declaring that, "No national forest shall be 
established, except to improve and protect the forest within the 
boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of 
water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the 
use and necessities of citizens of the United States." (June 4, 
1897, 16 USC 475)
Nor were voices raised about the lack of logic of permitting 
farmers and miners free use of any size and species of tree while 
[1] limiting commercial sales to "... the DEAD, MATURED, OR LARGE 
GROWTH OF TREES..." and [2] requiring all such trees to be marked 
before being sold (16 U.S.C. 472). Soon after 1905 the Forest 
Service began violating the 1897 timber sale restrictions. These 
violations were the basis for the Monongahela decision, which 
produced the 1976 NFMA.
Even the revered Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 
had no Senate hearing. Of greater import, the definition of these
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key terms, written by the Forest Service, had committee debate or 
public scrutiny. They became part of the law because the Forest 
Service was told that no bill would move without them. This 
occurred only because Associate Chief Crafts told Sen. Phil Hart of 
Michigan that he couldn’t add definition of these terms to the law 
because he was only a freshman Senator.
How And Why The First Fully Debated National Forest 
Management Act Became Law.
Let’s look at a few things that shaped this 20 year old 
law. In contrast with the 1891, 1897 and 1960 Acts, the 1976 NFMA 
was the product of extensive hearings, numerous, intense open mark­
up sessions, full reports and action in both Houses where its 
merits were discussed. The lengthy open Conference and reconciling 
report were discussed in each House. There were votes on each key 
provisions. Despite the one missing ingredient, an executive report 
endorsing or condemning the bill, it is a textbook example of how 
Congress should enact a law.
The need for the 1976 National Forest Management Act was 
assured after Judge Clement Haynsworth, deciding for the 4th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, confirmed that 70 years of Forest Service 
total disregard for the tight strictures imposed by 7 words in the 
1897 Act didn’t vitiate their plain meaning. At the same time other 
Federal Courts were following the 4th Circuits’ lead.
When the Izaak Walton League suit in West Virginia was under 
way, I was working on the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources 
Act of 1974. Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey gave the law its impetus, 
while the basic idea came from former Chief Richard E. McArdle. 
"Mac", I, and Sen. Humphrey enjoyed several discussions about his 
desire to create a mechanism to focus on the NATIONAL natural 
resource courses needed to benefit future generations. Fully aware 
that private forest and range were the backbone and dominant part 
of America’s land base, Humphrey’s wanted, as he put it, to "get 
the Forest Service out of the eye of the storm."
When I asked "Mac" about the West Virginia suit he told me 
that in the 50’s his counsel told him that 1897 Act was being
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He now wasviolated. He decided to "let sleeping dogs lie", 
positive that the Court would agree. My checks confirmed this. The 
plaintiff’s chose the 4th Circuit because Haynsworth’s firm 
conviction was that Congress fixes laws.
In consultation with Sen. Talmadge and Humphrey, Mike McLeod, 
Committee counsel, and I drafted an amendment to the RPA bill for 
Sen. Eastlands’ subcommittee. It said that the Forest Service could 
sell timber on an environmentally and economically sound basis, and 
would mark trees before sale only when necessary (i.e., selection 
sales). The Forest Service and the Timber Industry, which had filed 
an amicus brief with the District Court, swiftly asked Sen. 
Talmadge to remove the provision. Both said they’d win this suit. 
While Talmadge disagreed with their estimate, he removed it. A few 
weeks later the District Court held the 1897 law was being 
violated. Both quickly asked Talmadge that the section be restored. 
He flatly declined, crisply telling Industry when they visited, 
"You wanted to be in Court, you stay in Court. You go to the Court 
of Appeals." The 1974 RPA let the 1897 language stand.
Setting The Legislative Course.
In 1975 after the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the 
District Court, the Forest Service faced a formidable problem. It 
is notable that the Industry and the Service erroneously trumpeted 
the Court action as solely a clear cutting ban. They glossed over 
reality: the 1897 stricture prevented any silviculturally sound
cutting. It lacked silvicultural roots. Justice declined to go to 
the Supreme Court. The timber program would come to a halt.
Sen. Jennings Randolph (D WV) began work on a bill to permit 
selection cutting and thinning sales, and impose many other 
restraints. I was asked to participate but soon told that so many 
issues were closed to discussion that the product would not be 
silviculturally rational. His bill was introduced Feb. 4, 1976.
Because 1974 efforts to help had been rejected, Senators 
Talmadge and Humphrey, as well as Chairman Foley were willing to 
let the Industry, the Forest Service and the Ford Administration 
live with their miscalculation. A few members introduced "quick
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fix" bills, but they were "DOA". The Ford Administration wouldn’t 
let the Forest Service propose a bill.
However, after several talks, Humphrey and Talmadge agreed to 
take up a bill if it had bi-partisan support. A 8 page bill, half 
of which was amendments to the 1974 RPA was developed. It outlined 
Forest Plan content, based on what the Forest Service said was 
their process. It struck the seven 1897 Act words from the tree 
sale authority, and changed the marking rule. The bill introduced 
on Mar. 6th, had 6 Democratic and 7 Republican cosponsors, and 
quickly had 20. Sharp lines were drawn between protagonists, as 
well as within the Congress. The Ford Administration stood mute. It 
was apparent that legislating could be hard and contentious.
Sen. Agriculture Com. Counsel Mike McLeod, Jim Giltmier and I 
met with Sen. Talmadge to get our "marching orders". He laid down 
3 canons. First, the "Interior Committee boys" would participate. 
Mike objected, pointing out that the Ag Committee would be giving 
up jurisdiction. Talmadge crisply told us, "I’ve already invited 
Scoop" (Chairman Jackson).
Next, Sen. Randolph was to be in the hearings and mark up. 
When Mike objected because he wasn’t on either Committee, Sen. 
Talmadge dismissed this saying, "I’ve already invited Jennings."
In earlier discussions of a basic bill framework, I outlined 
two routes: (1) A bill with prescriptions, but different than 
Randolph’s, or (2) A bill that set forth concepts that the 
Secretary would flesh out with regulations. Senators Humphrey and 
Talmadge had selected the "concept" approach. Fixing a piercing eye 
on me, he said, "I want a bill that passes the Senate unanimously, 
and you’re going to help me get it." My role was screen all 
proposals to assure that they were not prescriptive and see that 
each one fostered improved resource management, as well as develop 
amendments that gave Members ownership in the final bill. All 
proposals were first discussed with Sen. Talmadge, Sen. Humphrey, 
then with whoever they asked me to consult. Additionally, I was to 
explain all provisions in the Committee mark-up. Chairman Foley and 
Talmadge later had me do this in the Conference. I also worked with
5
several House members including Chairman Foley, Bob Duncan, Max 
Baucus, Jim Weaver, Jim Johnson and "Bizz" Johnson, as well as the 
several able staff on the Senate and House Committees.
One of the most unique aspects in the process is how Sen. 
Talmadge intuitively set strategy. He put results above long­
standing parochial committee positions. This, in so far as I can 
recall, was the first joint committee hearing and mark-up. It had 
the added feature of direct participation by another Senator with 
a bill before the Committee, but not on it, Jennings Randolph who 
chaired the Public Works Committee. In addition, Sen. Talmadge 
wanted the Chief of the Forest Service present and participating in 
the mark-up. This law is a classic example securing involvement by 
key people.
Clearly, Chairman Talmadge was expanding his legislative 
hallmark; the "politics of inclusion". He listened to all ideas as 
he guided the Committee toward a product that would pass the Senate 
without amendment. Amendments that were not prescriptive got his 
approval for presentation.
Cong. Tom Foley, who Chaired the House Committee, decided that 
he would let the Senate break ground. His task was complicated when 
Cong. Litton, who started their hearings, was killed in an airplane 
accident and the mercurial John Melcher became the subcommittee 
chair.
Some lobbyists had the idea that I had some special influence 
over Sen. Talmadge. He encouraged this. The fact is that he made 
every decision on whether an idea had merit, and who should be 
asked to propose it. He greeted ideas put forward without being 
first discussed with him with great caution. He wanted proposals 
evaluated before they were formally put forward. As a real 
conservative, he was leery of proposals sprung without preliminary 
discussion, examination and open consideration.
Some NFMA Provisions.
Marginal Lands.
What became Sec. 6 (k), dealing with marginal lands, is an apt 
example of how he proceeded. Marion Clawson, who was on Nixon’s
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PAPTE Commission, proposed the concept in the hearing. Sen. Dale 
Bumpers thought it useful. His staff drafted an amendment, first 
discussed with Sen. Talmadge. It’s core principle was that National 
Forest lands where financial or environmental outcomes were unsound 
should be removed from the logging base until cutting was financial 
sound, and they could be safely logged. Industry strongly objected. 
They opposed removing any land from the timber base because this 
would reduce the ASQ. The Forest Service, which claimed this was 
their practice, also was very cool to the idea, even though the 
regulation writing process would provide flexibility. The concept 
made sense to Sen. Talmadge. When Senator Hatfield, seeking 
reconsideration, asked me to explain it again, Sen. Talmadge 
stopped me as he looked down the table at Sen. Hatfield, declaring, 
"Mark, what this section means is only an idiot forester would cut 
tree where they know they won’t grow right." The language was 
forceful, not eloquent. He then said, "Let’s vote", the Joint 
Committee turned down the proposal to strip the section.
In the House Industry successfully lobbied against 6(k).
Sen. Metcalf decided to give his seat on the Conference to 
Sen. Bumpers. He let .it be known that if the Conference version 
didn’t have Bumpers marginal lands section and his on "Sustained 
Yield", he’d filibuster the Conference bill to death.
In the Conference Cong. Foley, well aware that adoption of 
language that addressed this issue was vital offered a substitute 
late one afternoon. When the Conference broke up Sen. Bumpers 
invited me, and as I recall staff from Sen. Metcalf’s office and 
Mike Harvey, the Interior Committee’s counsel to his office. There 
was general agreement that the language met Sen. Bumper’s goal. The 
assumption was that Industry would seek to get a member to object 
and the Forest Service would remain cool. Sen. Bumpers called 
Chairman Talmadge to notify him he would accepted the language. The 
next morning Talmadge immediately recognized Bumpers, who said that 
in the spirit of compromise he accepted the House section. With no 
hesitation, Sen. Talmadge said, "The Senate recedes.", as he moved 
to the next matter. Twenty years later it is hard to describe the
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chemistry of a situation where two dominant Chairs shape the 
process without seeming to do so.
Sustained Yield.
Sen. Metcalf’s "Sustained Yield" section was drafted by Mike 
Harvey, and discussed with Talmadg’e . When put forward Industry 
vociferously objected. Their interest was in having the highest 
possible ASQ set regardless of Government cost or impacts.
The Forest Service was peculiarly cool, despite the fact that 
the concept was what the Service said was their policy. The Forest 
Service was torn by two conflicting internal factions: One held
that the older stands were growing slowly. Cutting them, even more 
rapidly than current growth, would quickly would spur future 
growth, thus producing a larger "sustained yield". Others held the 
Service position of the ’50’s - the National Forests should be "Old 
Growth Reservoirs". The Service should not only keep cut in balance 
with growTth, but also retain some stands based on natural life 
cycle rotations. In the Pacific Northwest this could put some land 
on 400 year rotations - quite at odds with those arguing for 60 
year rotations. This view was rooted in the position that private 
owners could not and should not be expected to forego the profits 
from their forests. The law chose the conservative concept.
One aspect that was telling to me was a visit John Walker of 
Simpson arranged through a Southern timber firm with Sen. Talmadge. 
At this 8 AM meeting he launched into such a technical discussion 
of why rapid old-growth liquidation was financially sound that Sen. 
Talmadge interrupted John to ask if he’s like the Senator’s view. 
He forcefully said that if he owned the National Forests he’d cut 
them all down. John beamed. Talmadge continued " But I didn’t own 
them, American people own them - and they didn’t want them cut 
down. John’s face fell. Talmadge closed with, "And we ain’t going 
to do it!" Walker, and I think others, really didn’t comprehend 
that Sen. Talmadge was succinctly describing the difference between 
public resource management and private management, because Walker 
continued to try to press his point to no avail.
When the Committees got to Conference there was considerable
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contentious debate on whether to adopt the Senate language. This is 
lost because no record of the Conference discussion was made. An 
amended Senate provision was adopted. Some wanted community 
stability and other matters added in law as reasons to cut beyond 
sustained yield limits. Accepted at first, as conferees sought to 
add more reasons the 2 Chairs said, lets not do this - we will list 
in the Conference report a few examples of where cutting may be 
above SY levels for a time. By vote the language just added was 
stripped. Page 33 of the Conference report says the ASQ can be 
varied to improve age-classes, facilitate future SY, or reduce 
mortality losses.
A notable addition was made by Sen. Church. The conferees had 
decided that volume in excess of a 10 year ASQ could be sold as 
salvage. The Conferees accepted Sen. Church’s language requiring 
salvage be counted against the regular green ASQ, unless the need 
developed late in the Plan cycle. The Conferees were aware that 
even if the ASQ was exceeded then, the next Plan would have to take 
the overcutting into account. The basis for this was that the 
salvage timber actually comes from recently green trees which, 
absent this catastrophic loss, would be in the regular ASQ. The 
Conferees were concerned that salvage not be an excuse to overcut.
The law directs in Sec. 13. "(a) The Secretary... shall limit 
the sale of timber from each national forest to a quantity EQUAL OR 
LESS THAN a quantity which can be removed from such forest annually 
in perpetuity on a sustained-y.ield basis." (emphasis added).
"(b) Nothing in subsection (a) ...shall prohibit the Secretary 
from salvage or sanitation harvesting of timber stands which are 
substantially damaged by fire, windthrow, or other catastrophe, or 
which are in imminent danger from insect and disease attack. The 
Secretary may either substitute such timber for timber that would 
otherwise be sold under the plan or, if not feasible, sell such 
timber over and above the plan volume." (16 USC 1611).
Sec. 6(g)(3)(D), provides that if ASQ increases based on 
intensive management procedures don’t work, or aren’t funded, the 
next Plan’s ASQ must be reduced.
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Sen. Hatfield pursued to his efforts to weaken the sustained 
yield section in the Senate debate on the Conference but no change 
was made. As Chairman Foley observed later, individual floor 
statements about desires have no standing. This topic remains a 
contentious issue as damage to watersheds, fisheries and endangered 
species from road and clearcuts have come into prominence. 
Monitoring And Research of Problems - An Early Warning Concept.
Sec. 6(g)(3)(C) provides for continuous monitoring and 
assessment of actions and research on problems. The provision 
recognized evidence presented in the hearing that great pressure 
was on current tasks, especially "getting out the cut". Far to 
little was done on measuring the impact of actions, or key research 
to observed problems. The section was adopted with warm agreement 
because it made good sense. In reality, it didn’t take a law to 
direct that good stewardship prevail. However, it was 14 years 
before Monitoring Reports began to be issued. More seriously, the 
reports are largely, "We planned to sell 50 MMBF and sold 51 MMBF". 
They don’t identify the cause of problems or the action and 
research that will correct them. A July 1996 U.S.D.A OIG report 
finds that, "CONTROLS OVER PROGRAM PERFORMANCE MEASURES DATA 
CONTINUE TO BE INADEQUATE". Numerous deficiencies were found in 
when and what to count, accuracy, and corrective action.
Public Participation and Advisory Boards.
Both bills had several public participation instructions, 
including creating broad-gauged advisory boards. This has never 
been implemented. Whether these would have helped solve the 
confrontations the Service has faced remains an open question. 
Committee of Scientists.
This was in the Senate bill. The House accepted it with little 
debate. The members were to review the Forest Plan regulations the 
Service was to develop. The Chief nominated an outstanding group of 
people. Then, remarkably they were given the task of developing the 
regulations, which they did very competently. The regulations 
weren’t developed internally, then examined, proposed for 
adjustment and ratification by the Committee. In my view, the
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Service failed to secure the wide internal discussion that would 
have helped employees to feel that these were their regulations. 
Plant and Animal Diversity.
The language requiring guidelines to provide for the diversity 
of plant and animal communities was common to both bills. It was 
strengthened in Conference by incorporating the stronger procedural 
aspects of the House bill. The struggles the Service has had with 
this issue stem from their regulations, not weaknesses in the law. 
Purchaser Sale Operating Plans and Contract Extension Limitations.
Both versions required purchasers to file operating plans that 
were to be followed, although they had slight differences. Here the 
Conferees tightened the requirement by combining the strongest part 
of each bill. The purpose was to eliminate the practice of some 
firms that left sales uncut until a contract was almost ready to 
expire and then seek and get an almost automatic extension. Often 
delayed purchaser road construction and operation required costly 
revision of planned sales.
The other part of this was the limitation on extensions. The 
Conference report specified that extensions should be granted only 
when "the purchaser has performed diligently...and that extension 
would be in the public interest." In the last 2 years, sweeping 
extensions have been given despite the design of the law around 
dealing with each purchaser as an individual.
The Salvage Fund.
I drafted the Salvage provision for Sen. Bellmon, The House 
bill picked it up. It was intended to be a small revolving fund 
that captured specified costs, which might not be all that the sale 
required. Sen. Bellmon’s idea was that if at least the specified 
costs could be recovered the timber could be sold. The Forest 
Service has never shown the volume and value of "salvage" sales. 
Thus it never has been possible to evaluate whether the law is 
being followed, or the results of annual salvage sales. For the 10 
years, 1979-1988 the total collections were reported at $166 
million. For 1989-1995, the total was $1.1 billion, as the program 
grew, but reporting was avoided.
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The Church Guidelines - Reforestation And Clear Cutting.
In 1972, after extensive hearings, the Interior Committee had 
devised, with Forest Service help, a set of guidelines to apply to 
timber sales. The hope and expectation was that this would resolve 
the growing controversies over timber sale practices, including 
clearcutting. Chief Cliff announced these guidelines would be 
policy. This did not stem the controversies, which in fact 
increased.
As the bill proceeded, Sen. Metcalf asked that the guideline 
be put in the bill. I’ll mention two of the 4 guidelines. On 
reforestation, with the assent of the Chief the rule that stands 
not be cut that could not regenerate within 5 years was accepted. 
A few years ago the Shoshone decided 7 years was O.K. and the Chief 
agreed. A suit was filed that held that 5 meant 5. The Service went 
to the Court of Appeals which, interestingly, found that 5 years 
could be 7 years. In so far as I am aware monitoring has never 
established the on-the-ground reality.
The need to use clearcuts so extensively, and their size was 
a most contentious issue. It nearly produced a strict size limit in 
law. Page 30 of the Conference report gives a good account of what 
was decided. The guideline was strengthened by requiring that clear 
cuts be used only where needed to meet management objectives. 
Further, an interdisciplinary team was to set size limits using the 
5 principles set forth in the law, and apply special safeguards 
when fire or other catastrophe called for larger cutting areas.
The size and impact of especially post-fire salvage sales, 
continues to be a source of debate among silviculturists, general 
contention, confrontation with concerned citizens. Land slides on 
recent clearcuts and road washouts following major storms have 
fueled the debate. Laws and regulations can only set the framework. 
On-the-ground actions determine outcomes.
The Conference.
Each bill, when reported, had 35 or more pages. For the 
Conference Staff put together a huge document: each bill, side by 
side clearly showing at least 34 differences. Because of the
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differing bill structures, parts didn’t mesh, which was an added 
complication. In addition, even when the two bills agreed some 
Members wanted to discuss where the matter should be placed. My job 
in the Conference was to be sure every point was covered. As we 
reached the end, I had missed three House provisions. 
Representative Costs Versus Receipts.
The House bill had what became Sec 6(1), a provision authored 
by Cong. George Brown, even then a senior member. Its core 
requirement is that representative samples will be in annual 
reports for reforestation and stand improvement costs, as well as 
on timber sales made where expenditures exceed the Governments’ 
return (i.e. below-cost sales).
As the Conference drew to a close Cong. Brown asked what had 
happened to his section on tracking ALL sale and reforestation 
costs. When the Senate Conferees suggested using A REPRESENTATIVE 
SAMPLE, it was quickly accepted.
Meaningful displays of units costs of producing various 
National Forest outputs has been a consistent weakness.
The Service never produced facts on sale costs, revenue and returns 
(i.e. profit or loss). In fact, its annual report on timber still 
shows only volume sold and cut in MBF and dollars, with no 
discussion of unit costs or trends. A full financial picture on 
timber offered versus sold, unsold timber, appraised versus bid 
prices, uncut timber under contract (volume and value) and many 
post-sale facts, are omitted or glossed over.
From 1977 to 1991 the annual report foreword dutifully recited 
the Sec. 6(1) requirement for reforestation, stand improvement and 
be.low-cost timber sales representative samples. None were provided. 
In 1992 the Service solved this failure by dropping the citation 
that this is required by law. Deep sixing continues with a Service 
erroneous claim that their accrual accounting by Forests, despite 
its total absence of sampl.es, meets the law. Their claim is further 
undercut in the July USDA OIG Audit 08401-4-AT, which says:
"In our opinion, the [Forest Service] Financial Statements do not 
present fairly, in conformity with applicable Government accounting
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principles, the[ir] financial position.... Our audit identified 
pervasive errors , material or potentially material misstatements, 
and/or departures from applicable Government accounting 
principles..." The Service continues to violate Sec.6(1).
Bid Monitoring and Anti-Competitive Behavior.
Cong. Krebs had a provision in the House bill to deal with a 
persistent problem, collusive bidding and other anti-competitive 
behavior, which are hard to prove and tough to erase. It was 
watered down in the House bill to cover only sales less than 1 
million BF. Sec. 14 (e) also required monitoring systems to
identify patterns of noncompetitive bidding, and a reports. When 
Cong Krebs asked about this provision, Sen. Talmadge suggested that 
it should not be limited to sales less than 1 million BF. He found 
agreement on requiring sealed bidding on all sales EXCEPT WHERE THE 
SECRETARY DETERMINES OTHERWISE BY REGULATION . The Conference 
report instructed the Forest Service to use "public participation 
in developing such regulations and that such regulations shall 
accord the Secretary the discretion top employ oral bidding or a 
mix of bidding..." (emphasis added).
The Forest Service totally ignored that instruction. Without 
any public participation, a few weeks after NFMA became law the 
field was to make sealed bidding universal, which was not what the 
law required. This overt violation of the intent of the law and the 
Conference instructions stoked an Industry campaign to repeal it. 
A 1978 revision substituted a weak monitoring and collusion control 
mechanism, which has been badly administered, as is cited at page 
23 of the OIG report of July 18, 1996, and their special audit on 
theft of March 1996. The Service persists in relying on oral 
bidding, which it couples with appraisals that reduce advertised 
prices by as much as 1/3 below expected prices. The contrast is 
their vigorous actions against timber sale protesters.
Stands_Must Reach Culmination of Mean Annual Increment
Before Cutting.
My third lapse was on Cong. Brown’s provision that culmination 
of mean annual increment of growth must generally have been reached
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to cut stands. He raised this in the late afternoon of the final 
day as it appeared that all points had been covered and everyone 
was tired. Sen. Talmadge, looked down the table at his colleagues 
and said, "The Senate recedes". The full import of this section was 
never discussed.
Where To Go and How To Get There.
There are many other parts of the NFMA that could be discussed 
at length. One need only add up all the pages of hearings, mark-up 
reports and floor debate to realize that even the CMAI provision 
has roots. In addition, there are the voluminous regulations and 
internal handbooks that chart agency direction.
Norm Johnson at OSU, and Maggie Shannon at Maxwell have had 
their classes critique sections of the law. A most useful action 
before undertaking revisions would be a much more detailed review 
that can be completed in these 3 days.
I think that the right course was chosen when it was decided 
to use departmental regulations to .specify how the broad authority 
in NFMA would be implemented. One of the missing ingredients is a 
system of biennial re-evaluation and change that has real 
monitoring data as a basis, and uses a genuine broad-gauged 
committee of citizens and government people who meet openly.
Robert E. Wolf, 3245 Lloyd Bowen Road St. Leonard Md, 20685-2411 
410-586-1767 - August, 24, 1996. 
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